LIKE THE WINGS OF A BIRD
THE MYTHS AND REALITY
IN PLO-HAMAS RELATIONSHIP

By Yosef Bodansky

HAMAS's Sheikh Mahmoud Zahar on the relationship between the PLO and the HAMAS: "Like the wings of a bird, they must work together."

The series of terrorist bombs that rocked Israel in recent weeks have again revived the basic questions: What is really happening in the Middle East? Is true Arab-Israeli peace finally possible after generations of war?

These are not illogical questions. It is in the course of "making peace" with the PLO that Israel has been subjected to the worst wave of terrorism in its history. It is at the time that the US claims to be asserting prominence in the Middle East as the sole viable mediator of Arab-Israeli disputes that the stability of pro-Western Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain, is challenged by the Islamists. At the same time, Washington's nemesis -- Saddam Hussein -- remains unchallengeable in Baghdad. A defiant Iran increases its strategic influence throughout the region, including dissuading Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad from accepting US offers for expanding the now symbolic peace negotiations with Israel. How can Washington claim to being to dominant superpower in the Middle East, shepherding the local states toward peace and reconciliation, when a pariah state like Iran repeatedly demonstrates more influence in Damascus than the US?

Indeed, the strategic dynamics in the Middle East is completely different than the rosy "new Middle East" presented by the Clinton Administration and the Peres Government. Significantly, it is the existence of this "new Middle East" that is at the heart of the "peace process" logic.

The real dominant trend in the Middle East is Islamist revivalism. The population at large has given up on the whole process of Westernization, let alone reconciliation with Israel. The radicalization of the Muslim World is an indigenous grass-roots phenomena, driven and fueled by the economic misery and destitute, arbitrary political oppression by a range of despots, and overall loss of hope. This plight is transformed into a political-military force by the terrorism sponsoring states -- Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Pakistan.

Although ideologically driven, these terrorism sponsoring states are also calculating and pragmatic. Under Tehran's undisputed leadership they pursue realistic strategy that is built on their presumption of a fateful struggle against the West and the process of Westernization. Significantly, this struggle is against the US -- the Great Satan. In the Islamists' vocabulary Israel is only an instrument of the American onslaught on Islam -- "the illegitimate offspring of the Great Satan". Israel's destruction is only a major milestone on the road to a successful Islamist revolution -- an objective of crucial importance but not the end of the struggle.

The near term objective of the terrorism sponsoring states is to consolidate Islamist hegemony over the entire Hub of Islam -- from Morocco to India, from Central Asia to Central Africa. Eliminating Israel is but a component -- albeit a very important one. Presently, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt under a mounting Islamist threat, Tehran and its allies see a historical window of opportunity to surge and expand their hold over the hub of Islam.

This strategic surge is conducted under the rallying cry "Islam is the solution!" -- an all encompassing hope for a swift and divine solution to the plight and misery of a population that had long given up on the ability of the existing Arab states to provide them with hope and a future. The myriad of social services and charitable work provided by the various Islamist organizations serve as a proof that the daily lot of the population will indeed improve in the Islamic State advocated by the Islamists.

The Islamist terrorism and subversion complement the Islamist reach. Terrorism is the primary and most effective instrument of the sponsoring states in their struggle against states and powers resisting the spread of the Islamic Revolution. Unlike radicalism -- terrorism is not an indigenous phenomena. It takes great amounts of expertise and money to transform a bunch of agitated radicalized youth into a potent terrorist cell. It is through the providing of ideological guidance, training and expertise, as well as funds that the sponsoring states transform the grassroots Islamist radicalism into a potent terrorist organization. Because of the stakes at hand -- the ability of Iran and its allies to consolidate hegemony over the Hub of Islam -- all the ostensibly local Islamist terrorist movements are actually tightly controlled by the sponsoring states. The current wave of terrorism in Israel conducted under the banner of HAMAS is an integral component of this movement.

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Israel's and US dealing with the Palestinian National Authorities (PNA), and especially Yassir Arafat, should be examined against this overall trend dominating the Muslim World, and particularly the Arab World. Given the authoritarian nature of the PNA and the centrality of Arafat to the "Peace Process", the real position of Arafat is a key issue.

The present Oslo process has emerged out of the Israeli left's frustration with the Intifada -- the Islamist populist uprising that shook the territories in the late 1980s. If the Oslo process succeeds, Israel will withdraw from Judea, Samaria and Gaza almost back to the 1967 borders and a Palestinian state will be established in the territories. Hence, the Oslo process centers on the future of the Arab population living under Israeli rule since June 1967.

Arafat has never been their real leader. He rose to prominence in the early 1960s, when Jordan and Egypt still ruled the territories, and escaped from Ramallah in December 1967. Yassir Arafat represents the older generation of the refugees of 1948 -- the people who escaped from pre-1967 Israel. His natural constituency is expected to lose everything, including the glimmer of hope of a "return", from the Oslo process for it assumed that pre-1967 Israel will be recognized in return for the Palestinian state in the territories.

At the same time Arafat is but a fading symbol to the young Arab constituency in the territories. The genuine leadership of the very young Arab population in the territories is radical Islamist. It is a grassroots movement that had won admiration and loyal following in the barricades of the Intifadah, the clandestine sermoning and confidence building sessions in underground mosques, in the channeling of foreign aid to social services to the destitute of the refugee camps (when Arafat's cronies and other establishment Arabs amassed fortunes while "under occupation"). Little wonder that HAMAS rules the street.

In contrast with the vibrant post-Intifadah young Islamist leadership, Arafat was near extinction in the early 1990s after the collapse of his terrorist empire to the Islamists and his all out support for Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Thus, by empowering Arafat on a political process (putting aside its overall logic and likelihood of success), Israel and the US alienated virtually every major sector of the Palestinian population -- except for the cronies lavishly bribed with embezzled foreign aid. The Palestinian old guard in the "diaspora" realizes that they had been sold. The despair among their youth leads to terrorism abroad. As already discussed, Arafat lacks legitimacy or genuine support in the territories. Having been enthroned by the hated Israelis and Americans, Arafat symbolizes a Western effort to impose a foreign-controlled leader in order to contain the rise of Islam and save Israel.

Yassir Arafat is fully aware of this dynamics and his doing his utmost to prove his radical Islamist credentials. After all, Arafat comes from the Husseini clan, a distant relative of Hajj Amin al-Husseini -- the role model of the Islamist radicals. Arafat stresses this family connection, as well as the fact that in his youth he was member of underground Muslim Brotherhood (until he had to abandon them in order to get support from Egyptian intelligence to the fledgling al-Fatah in the early 1960s).

But Arafat and his close confidants have never disengaged from radical Islam. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Arafat and the PLO elite were very active in supporting Khomeyni's forces in Iran, where they were exposed to the power and zeal of the Islamic Revolution. In the mid to late 1980s, al-Fatah developed and ran a very effective Islamic Jihad of their own. Abu-Jihad, Arafat's closest confidant who was killed by Israel in April 1988 because he worked to bring Islamist radicalism under the PLO's banner, acknowledged the strength of Islamism already in the early 1980s. He integrated elements of PLO into the then fledgling international 'Afghan' movement (Arabs and other foreigners who came to fight in Afghanistan). In 1988, Abu-Jihad and Arafat tried to convince the fledgling HAMAS to join the PLO.

Indeed, in its August 1988 Covenant, the HAMAS did not rule out cooperation with the PLO in the pursuit of their common goal -- the destruction of Israel. In the Covenant, the HAMAS put the liberation struggle in the context of Islamist jihad. "From the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, nationalism [wataniyya] is a component/part of religious belief. There is no greater and profound nationalism than a situation where the enemy occupies Muslim land. Then the jihad becomes and obligatory duty for every Muslim man and woman." The HAMAS identified the PLO as "the closest organization" to the Muslim Brotherhood but emphasized their profound disagreement with the "idea of secular state" adopted by the PLO. "The secular idea completely contradicts the religious teachings," the HAMAS decreed. since then, HAMAS leaders have repeatedly stressed that the main difference between themselves and the PLO is not the on the fate of Israel -- its total destruction and the establishment of a Muslim Palestinian state in its stead -- but on which flag will wave over the liberated Palestine. HAMAS insists on the Banner of Allah, while the PLO insists on the flag of Palestine.

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Now, once his leadership of the PNA has been acknowledged in the Oslo process, Arafat is returning to the proven Islamist methods. His commitment to the Islamist cause -- hence the complete destruction of Israel -- goes far beyond his repeated invoking of Islamist themes in speeches. It has not been lost on Arafat that some of the key military units of the PLO most loyal to him turned Islamist. Thus, Arafat's support for the Islamists is both ideologically motivated and very pragmatic -- a quest for self-survival.

For example, Colonel Munir Makdah, the former protege of Yassir Arafat and chief of his forces in Lebanon and commander of the Companies of the Black 13 September [1993] organization (the reorganization of al-Fatah's forces south of Beirut), now leads Islamist terrorist forces. On April 15, 1995, he inspected the training of 70 suicide-terrorists who are finishing their training course at the Ain-Hilwe camp in southern Lebanon. This new suicide-commando force has already been put under the authority of Palestinian Islamic Jihad's military wing -- Al-Kuwa al-Islamiya al-Mutakila (Fighting Islamic Forces) -- and is being prepared for spectacular operations in both southern Lebanon and the heart of Israel. This new force joins the HizbAllah-Pasdaran reinforcements Iran allocated to the escalation in southern Lebanon, as well as a host of Syrian-controlled Palestinian units now being prepared for deployment into southern Lebanon.

Eager to remain in power and continue to amass fortune, Arafat goes out of his way to ensure cooperation with Islamist leaders. Moreover, Arafat himself has repeatedly assured the Islamist leadership at the highest levels of his support for their struggle and terrorism. For example, in early October 1994, Yassir Arafat wrote a letter to Shaykh Yassin, the supreme leader of the HAMAS, and al-Ahdi Hunim, a leading Islamist terrorist, both of whom are still in Israeli jail, confirming his appreciation of, and support for, the Islamist armed struggle: "My brother Shaykh Yassin, and my brother the sacred Shaykh al-Ahdi Hunim, I admire your participation in the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. It is because of you that Palestine is free. We've proven with the blood of our martyrs that the Palestinian people is 'the strong number' in the Middle East." Indeed, Arafat now even recognizes the spiritual leadership of Shaykh Yassin -- the leader of HAMAS -- in his public speeches. Little wonder, therefore, that both PNA and Islamist activists know that Arafat's threats of an all out assault on the HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, or even his promises of a crackdown, are empty gestures. The occasional arrest of a few Islamists and the destruction of property should not be confused with a thorough dismantling of the Islamist infrastructure in the territories -- something that the PNA not only cannot do but actually does not want to do.

Indeed, several of Arafat's key intelligence and security senior commanders now supervising the PLO's campaign against HAMAS, including Jibril Rajub, the Chief of Internal Security, have repeatedly declared their total support for the

HAMAS. Back in mid September 1994, Rajub stressed that there are "blood ties and single fate" between the PLO and the HAMAS. Rajub rejected any notion of his forces taking part in fighting Islamist terrorism, or even limiting the activities of the HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip in order to prevent terrorism inside Israel. "We are not an insurance company," he explained. "We are not responsible for the security of the Israelis, but to the security of the Palestinians." The track record of the security forces speaks volumes. The real mission of the Palestinian security organs is to deal with the Islamists only when they are implicated in conspiracies against Arafat.

The active preparations for the current terrorist offensive begun in the aftermath of a PLO-HAMAS agreement that recognized the reality that the Islamists are predominant among the younger generation. The spirit and general attitude of the PLO toward the negotiations is important to understanding the extent of Arafat's commitments to Israel. Freih Abu-Medein, the PLO's Minister of Justice, was explicit in a speech delivered in mid April 1995: "The PLO and the [Islamist] opposition complement each other../... We regard HAMAS and Islamic Jihad as national elements../... The main enemy, now and forever, is Israel."

The documented record of the evolution of the PLO-HAMAS negotiations in the summer of 1995 clearly shows that it was the PLO that accepted the majority of the HAMAS positions, and not the other way. The September 20, 1995, draft of PLO-HAMAS Agreement points out the two key provisions that still dominates the relationship and co-existence between the two organizations. Paragraph (3) of the agreement respects "the commitments of the Palestinian Liberation Organizationensuing from the agreements signed with the Israeli government which require the cessation of all military operations in, or launched from, the areas under the Palestinian National Authority". This arrangement only prevents the HAMAS from launching operations from Zone A, which, as the recent HAMAS strikes indicate, was not adhered to completely. (The PLO's commitment to Israel to prevent terror, however, is not limited to attacks originating from PNA controlled territory.) Paragraph (12) forbids the PNA from taking preventive security measures. Both sides committed themselves to undertaking "measures to enhance safety, confidence, cooperation" between them. Specifically, "measures taken by the [PNA] security forces for preventive purposes must be stopped, in order to build up confidence between all."

In early January 1996, the PLO and HAMAS finally concluded their agreement after about two years of on-and-off negotiations. This time, the agreement was formalized in a joint statement. The key provisions for enabling the HAMAS to continue its terrorist operations remained. The HAMAS will continue to adhere to its principles regarding the uncompromising Jihad for the destruction of Israel. Operationally, the HAMAS will continue to strike at will except from Zone A to avoid embarrassing the PNA. For its part, the PLO commits itself not to act against HAMAS.

The HAMAS-PNA agreement reflects the reality on the ground, not the self-delusions of politicians. In courting the "soldiers" of the Intifadah, the PNA's leadership is aiming to reach cooperation with the young leadership that grew inside the territories. Having been exposed to intimate contacts with Israel, these young leaders are both aware of the value of freedoms learned from Israel (far exceeding anything in the Arab states) and have been radicalized by Islamism as the only counter-ideology capable of stopping the spread of Western ideas coming from Israel. Incapable of challenging, let alone reversing, these trends, Arafat and his lieutenants put themselves under Islamist guidance if not outright control. Even in order to survive, the PNA must cooperate with the local leadership. Arafat's repeated efforts to get Turabi's endorsement to key moves and finding compromise with the HAMAS are indicative of this trend.

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Thus, Arafat is not the "boss" in strategic terms. The overall course of the Islamic revolution in Israel and the territories is determined in Tehran. The escalation of the Jihad is guided by Iran -- directly and through Syria, Sudan and Pakistan. Indeed the principles and strategy of the present escalation of terrorism at the heart of Israel were debated and decided upon in a major terrorism conference in Tehran in mid January 1996. The key leaders of the Palestinian Islamist terrorist organizations attended this conference. Significantly, the Palestinian Islamists committed themselves to the current escalation not as a distinctly anti-Israel Jihad, but as an integral part of an all out breakout in the Middle East originally decided upon in the PAIC conference in Khartoum in late March 1995. The bombing in Saudi Arabia in November 1995, the attempt on President Mubarak's life in June 1995, and the escalation of the Islamist subversion of Bahrain are also integral components of this region-wide Islamist escalation.

The Islamists, led by Tehran and Khartoum, have embarked on this onslaught because they are confident in their ability to overthrow, at the very least paralyze, the conservative -- the so-called moderate -- Arab regimes. The Islamist leadership is convinced, and not without good reason, that they can soon establish Islamist regimes throughout the Middle East. Recent developments in the key Arab states testify that their reading of the dynamics in the region -- the real mega-trends -- is very accurate.

Egypt is slowly overwhelmed by the Islamicization of society even as the security forces continue to confront the Islamist terrorists. Consequently, Egypt is increasingly on the verge of Islamist popular uprising. The population demonstrate genuine desire for Islamic regime (of some sort). The Islamists intensify their penetration of, and taking over, society through what Adel Darwish calls "Islamicization by stealth" -- a gradual domineering of society while conditioning the population to an Islamic regime. The Egyptian population, having lost faith in the ability of Mubarak's Cairo to resolve their economic plight and reverse the overall deterioration of the situation in Egypt, is ready for imposition of Sharia as a cure-all panacea. Meanwhile, larger and more professional terrorist cadres are being trained and prepared in Pakistan, Sudan, and Iran pending deployment to Egypt and the inevitable escalation of the Islamist armed struggle. The escalation of the Islamist armed struggle is bound to transform into a popular insurrection, thus serving as a demonstration of the wide reach and determination of the Islamists.

In Saudi Arabia, the main challenge facing the country is the self-destruction of the House of al-Saud. "Like a rotting carcass, the House of Saud is beginning to decompose," Said K. Aburish wrote. "If nothing is done then we will have a revolution, if not in 1997, then soon after." The population has given up on benefitting from the country's immense wealth, seeking instead solace from the corruption and dictatorship in the fold of revivalist Islam. The beginning of armed Jihad is thus both an expression of the extent of desperation of the majority of Saudis and the beginning of the Islamist final push to overthrow the House of al-Saud.

Syria, though not subjected to Islamist violence presently, is fully aware of the growing threat of revived Islamist insurrection. Syrian apprehension of the growing Islamist threat to the stability of Damascus has been recently revived by Iran and Sudan by parading Syrian Islamist leaders (now in virtual arrest in Khartoum) in the April 1995 PAIC conference. Now reminded of the Islamist option, Damascus got the message. As of the summer of 1995, there has been a marked improvement of the already intimate strategic cooperation and coordination with Tehran -- still its closest ally. This development is expressed in the escalation of HizbAllah and Palestinian terrorist activities in southern Lebanon. Syria's continued dissemination of "super-bills" and drugs is also an integral part of Syria's closer cooperation with Iran and the Islamist leadership. Meanwhile, the further consolidation of the Iran-dominated Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus axis only serves to bolster Damascus' self-confidence in its steadfast position and the military option.

Under such circumstances, the fate of regimes in Riyadh and Cairo is far from certain. Islamist regimes can be established there in the near future. Far more dangerous, however, is the ramifications of efforts by Cairo, Riyadh and even Damascus to reach compromise with the Islamists. The present regimes will be compelled to take strong positions that will placate and satisfy their militant Islamist constituencies rather than face violent overthrow. Active resumption of the military option against Israel, with an explicit commitment to fight until the complete destruction of the Jewish State and the establishment of a Muslim State in its stead, is a major demand of the Islamists.

The dramatic escalation of the Islamist terrorism at the heart of Israel, as well as the ensuing "oppression" of Islamists throughout Israel and the territories, are intended to serve as the catalyst for a wave of solidarity with the Islamist Jihad in Palestine and Islamist revivalism as a whole throughout the Middle East. Such a popular wave will bolster the Islamist resistance to US presence and influence throughout the entire region, severely and adversely affecting local governments.

It is very logical that the Palestinian Islamists have been chosen by Tehran to play such a crucial role of a regional catalyst. These organizations have closely cooperated with Iran since the late 1980s. Iran finances and trains the key Islamist organizations in Lebanon, Iran and Sudan. Several delegations of HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders have made pilgrimage to Tehran to receive instructions and arrange for massive financial and professional support. The key operational headquarters of the Palestinian Islamists (including HAMAS, Islamic Jihad and the Palestinian HizbAllah) is located in Damascus and run under close joint supervision of Syrian and Iranian intelligence.

The Iranian dominance is best demonstrated in the saga of Habibi's visits to Damascus. Iran's vice-president Hassan Habibi is responsible for regional strategy -- from the Trans-Asian Axis to Islamic Bloc and terrorism. He was first scheduled to visit Damascus in late December 1995. Tehran canceled this visit suddenly and in insulting manner to demonstrate its displeasure with Syrian propaganda on the desire for peace. The cancellation caused hysteria in Damascus, prompting a series of high-level assurances of Damascus' enduring commitment to their joint struggle. Habibi finally arrived in Damascus in late February 1996. The main objective of Habibi's visit to Damascus was "to achieve a coordination strategy among HizbAllah, the Jihad and HAMAS." He also held strategic discussions on future of Middle East with senior Syrian officials. Damascus stressed that "the two countries' views were identical" on all the subjects discussed. Meanwhile, veteran Iranian expert on terrorism, Hussein SheikolIslam, visited Beirut and the Biqaa, putting the still escalating ambitious Islamist plan into action.

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Little wonder that Arafat's own vision of, and plans for, the destruction of Israel are Islamist oriented. Arafat himself outlined his plan in a secret speech after a dinner for 40 Arab diplomats in the Spiegal Salon at the Grand Hotel in Stockholm, Sweden, on January 30, 1996. Arafat remarks were titled "The Impending Collapse of Israel". "We will take over everything including all of Jerusalem," he declared repeatedly.

Arafat's plan has two main components aimed to cause the Jews to abandon Israel. "Within five years we will have six to seven million Arabs living on the West Bank and in Jerusalem. All Palestinian Arabs will be welcomed back by us." Arafat explained that this will be the beginning of a pressure campaign resulting within a few years in Israel's ultimate destruction. "You understand that we plan to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian State. We will make life unbearable for Jews by psychological warfare and population explosion; Jews will not want to live among us Arabs! "

The two main components in Arafat's plan are Islamist dominated. The key to making life unbearable to the Jews is through terrorism campaign. As the Intifadah and the post-Oslo wave of terrorism have proven, only the Islamists have the perseverance and eagerness to withstand the necessary sacrifices. It is the Islamists, not the PNA, that will spearhead Arafat's campaign. More important is Arafat's declared intention to increase the Arab population to 6-7 millions. It has long been established that the poverty and concentration of people in economically deprived areas breeds Islamism. Arafat has already spent enough time in the Gaza Strip to know where the HAMAS and Islamic Jihad grow. Hence, the squeezing of 4-6 million additional Arabs into territories will transform virtually the entire population into radical Islamists. They indeed will be ready to burst against Israel virtually at all cost -- but under the banner of radical Islam!

Thus, Arafat would not have adopted these steps if he was not committed to an Islamist solution of the Israel-problem. Indeed, Arafat's own conclusion in Stockholm are befitting HAMAS, not the PNA: "I have no use for Jews; they are and remain Jews! We now need all the help we can get from you in our battle for a united Palestine under total Arab-Muslim domination!"

One should not be surprised by these developments. Ever the pragmatic and opportunistic survivalist, Yassir Arafat adapts to reality. He is not the only one recognizing the predominance of the Islamist revivalism.

A far more sophisticated and lucid observer is the eloquent Egyptian journalist and commentator Mohamed Heikal. In early 1996, Heikal stressed that the Arab World has always regarded the mere presence of a Jewish entity in the region as a "taboo". The Arab World is motivated by "a bled of fury and revulsion" toward Israel that the present "peace process" is yet to breach. The Arab leaders promoting any sort of reconciliation are perceived as traitors breaking the sacred taboo. Moreover, the mere existence of the "Peace Process" is driving the wider Arab World into the fold of radical Islamism where the destruction of Israel is a sacred duty. "No one can say how long the unjust peace of Oslo will last, but the strength of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad should be a signal. Islam is the only fortress of the old structure of the taboo still functioning. If Islam is being radicalized, it is because the Arab soul has been deprived of other defenses, leaving faith as the last redoubt of a taboo broken but not appeased. And therein lies the portent of coming dangers," Heikal concludes.

Under these circumstances, a genuine legitimization of Israel -- accepting the existence of non-Muslim entity on any part of the land -- is an illusion. The question of recognized borders, or the extent of Israeli withdrawal toward the 1967 borders, is completely irrelevant considering that the ultimate objective has remained the complete annihilation of Israel.

Now, as the socio-economic plight and misery of the "liberated" Palestinian population grows as a direct outcome of the implementation of the Oslo process and the Israeli imposed separation -- the popular commitment to militant Islamism surges. Any effort to crack down on the Islamists only increases the popular spread of Islamism -- because it is the dominant trend in the region dedicated to finding refuge from oppressions by Israel or the Arab leaders claiming reconciliation with it. Just to survive, Arafat knows he must cooperate with the Islamists. But the Islamists are the key to any effort to realize Arafat's real dream of destroying Israel, and, as Arafat articulated, the PNA is accepting the principles of their strategy for the destruction of Israel. This Islamist dominated struggle is at the core of a dynamics completely opposite to the vision of "new Middle East" upon which the "peace process" is based.

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Yossef Bodansky is the World Terrorism Analyst with the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies (Houston TX), He is a contributing editor of Defense and Foreign Affairs: Strategic Policy, the author of Freeman Center Research Papers (Pakistan, Kashmir & The Trans-Asian Axis, and Beijing's Surge for the Strait of Malacca), four books (Target America, Terror, Crisis in Korea, and Offensive in the Balkans), several book chapters, entries for the International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, and numerous articles in several periodicals including Global Affairs, JANE's Defence Weekly, Defense and Foreign Affairs: Strategic Policy, Business Week. In the 1980s, he acted as a senior consultant for the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

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The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views U.S. Congress, or any other branch of the U.S. Government.

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