INDIA AND ISRAEL
(The Freeman Center was instrumental in the initiation of military relations between India and Israel. This was done pre-Oslo via Shimon Peres, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of the alcoholic Jew murderer (The Altalena) Prime Misiter Yitzhak Rabin 1992. Sales of Israeli military projects to India as risen rapidly to over #2 billion per annum. The US military and industrial complex (Eisenhower) would like keep Israel emasculated and UNFREE/DEPENDANT on America for arms which leads to loss of Israel sovereignty and survival. I begged Peres not to cancel the Lavie deal and not to give into American pressure --- but he did. Barak must now show some independence for Israel. Barak is near canceling the sale of the Phalcon. As former Defense Minister (3 times) Moshe Arens said recently):
U.S. Military Aid: A Mixed Blessing
By Moshe Arens - Ha'aretz 27 June 2000
Seventeen years ago, U.S.-Israeli technological cooperation in defense projects reached its apex with the Lavi fighter-aircraft project. The Lavi was an Israeli-designed fighter, with a U.S. jet engine specially designed for it. The U.S. administration gave its green light to American technology transfer wherever needed, and Congress approved an annual allocation of 250 million dollars of U.S. military aid money to be spent in Israel for Lavi development, rather than for purchases in the U.S. A number of U.S. aerospace companies became partners in the program to develop the most advanced fighter-aircraft of its day - an aircraft superior to the F-16. It was an unprecedented level of cooperation not equaled by U.S. projects with any of its other allies. No wonder that those U.S. aerospace companies that were not involved in the program lobbied against it, and that then defense secretary Caspar Weinberger, who did not share the support of president Ronald Reagan and secretary of state George Shultz for the program, did his best to scuttle it. The surprising thing was, and is to this day, that a number of Israeli politicians and IDF generals, some of whom have since turned politicians, told Israel's friends in the U.S. administration and in Congress that Israel did not need the Lavi. Using deception and misinformation they succeeded in bringing about a one-vote majority in the cabinet for the cancellation of the Lavi project, that was at the time already in an advanced state of development. They struck a severe blow to Israel's defense capability and at U.S.-Israel technological cooperation, which never again reached a comparable level. That American pressure brought about the cancellation of the Lavi project is a myth. It was a self-inflicted wound.
Without exception, it has been Israel's experience throughout the years that the greater the degree of independence it demonstrates in weapon system development, the more inclined the U.S. administration is to provide Israel with advanced weapon technology. The logic of this policy is obvious: In all cases where Israel was on the point of attaining a level of technology equivalent to that of U.S. industry, or possibly even surpassing it, there was no reason to deny Israel access to this technology. In the Lavi project Israel was on the point of drawing level with the U.S. aircraft industry. Completion of the program would have given the Israel Air Force a superior fighter aircraft and one not available to Arab air forces. It was likely to give Israel continued access to U.S. aircraft technology, while fostering an on-going partnership in fighter aircraft development with U.S. industry.
All that is gone, and Israel has been feeling the effect in the intervening years. It has left Israel completely dependent on U.S. manufactured fighter aircraft for its air force. This dependence was demonstrated only recently when the United States refused to permit the installation of the superior Elta radar in the latest batch of F-16 aircraft purchased by Israel. Israel was told to take it or leave it.
The latest step is an attempt to block the sale of the Israeli developed Phalcon AWACS aircraft to China and to subject any future export of Israeli defense products to U.S. control. That, like the U.S. defense industry, the Israeli defense industry is dependent on export sales, is clear in Washington. The claim that operation of the Phalcon by the Chinese air force might endanger U.S. interests is very far-fetched, whereas the sale of the similar U.S. AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia and F-16s to Arab countries does create a potential danger to Israel. But Israel's dependence on U.S. military aid, and in particular the IAF's dependence on American fighter aircraft, makes it more difficult to stand up for Israel's security interests in this controversy.
The thinly veiled threats from Washington of a cut in U.S. military aid to Israel and a suspension of aircraft delivery to the IAF if the Phalcon sale to China is not canceled, should lead to a reexamination of the utility of U.S. military aid to Israel. The two billion dollar annual aid package, most of it restricted to use for purchases in the United States, is a mixed blessing. It has brought about a neglect of Israeli defense R&D and industry in favor of purchases in the United States, and brings in its wake restrictions on exports of the Israeli defense industry.
Recent years have made it clear that local defense research and development have been the foundation on which Israel's hi-tech industry has been built and that export of defense products constitute a significant share of Israeli exports. A close examination may very well determine that in the long run, the Israeli economy might be better served by the end of U.S. military aid and the acquisition of those American weapon systems needed by the IDF with Israeli resources.
Moshe Arens has been Israeli Defense Minister three times.