Golan Heights Weekly Full-Page Ad #11

(Ha'aretz, April 11, 2000)

Pre-Ad reflections:

1. Barak's chief negotiator with Syria, Uri Saguie, said on April 14th (Voice of Israel interview) that "Holding on to ethos has been the main hurdle on the road to peace." He added that "Israel - just like Syria - STILL (emphasis by Saguie!) possesses the ethos of the northeastern shores of the Lake of Galilee." The Barak-Clinton Spin Team is shaping the p.r. strategy to "cure" Israelis of their ethos!!!

2. Away from the limelight, in an attempt to instill a false sense of victory in the hearts of Golan Defenders, the Clinton-Barak Team persists in the attempt to conclude an Israeli-Syrian Accord, which would entail a Golan Giveaway. As it has happened with Israel-PLO negotiation, so will Israeli concessions (otherwise known as Confidence Building Measures) produce "progress" in the negotiation.

3. Some observers suggest that the expected July 2000 Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon may set the stage for the Israel-Syria Accord. Others point at Clinton's sand-glass, which runs out in November. And then there is Barak's comment - to his cabinet - ridiculing the importance accorded to a few hundred meters along the Lake of Galilee!!!

4. This is not the time for complacency!!! The time to EDUCATE the Israeli public is NOW, when logic prevails over emotions. Resting on our laurels plays into the hands of the Golan Giveawayers, who want us to withhold our activities until an accord is signed. Resuming activities while euphoric events are produced by the Clinton-Barak Spin Team will not accomplish The Mission.

5. While publishing the Weekly Full-Page Ads in the Hebrew daily Ha'aretz (catering to Barak's voters!), the Ariel Center For Policy Research (501C US organization) is launching - beginning May 16 - a Weekly Full-Page Ad campaign in the leading Russian daily in Israel, Vesty. Your assistance would be welcome!

Yoram Ettinger





LESSONS OF THE 1991 GULF WAR: Some 8,000 tons of missile and bombs per day couldn't defeat Saddam Hussein. He surrendered only when the US ground forces joined the war. The crucial role of the ground forces suggests the critical importance of ground features (geographical depth and topographical edge). About 70% of the missiles and bombs missed their targets. They couldn't destroy a single Scud launcher, despite the lack of an effective Iraqi air defense.

PENTAGON'S REPORT TO CONGRESS: "...Air Power [and missiles] alone could not have brought the war to so sharp and decisive a conclusion...The ground offensive option ensured that the Coalition would seize the initiative. A protracted air siege alone would not have had the impact that the combination of air, maritime and ground offensives was able to achieve. Without the credible threat of ground and amphibious attacks, the Iraqi defenders might have dispersed, dug in more deeply, concentrated in civilian areas, or otherwise adopted a strategy of outlasting the bombing from the air...Such a strategy would have prolonged the conflict and might have strained the political cohesion of the Coalition. Given more time, Iraq might have achieved Scud attacks with chemical or other warheads capable of inflicting catastrophic casualties on Israeli or Saudi citizens or on Coalition troop concentrations...A failure to engage on the ground would have left Saddam Hussein able to claim that his army was still invincible..." (Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final report to Congress, April 2000)

US GENERALS ON STRATEGIC DEPTH IN THE AGE OF MISSILES: "...Even though missiles can fly over the highest terrain feature, including the Golan Heights, they do not negate the strategic significance of territorial depth...The principal threat to Israel's existence for the foreseeable future will remain the danger of a physical invasion and occupation by heavily armored forces...Achieving military success in a war requires more than lobbing a few score (or even a few hundred) missiles of limited accuracy at soft targets...To win a war against Israel, Syria must move armor, infantry and artillery forward and down into Israel proper, and then destroy Israeli forces on the ground. This was true in 1948, it was true in 1967 and 1973, and it remains true in today's Age of Missiles..." (US Forces On The Golan Heights? A special report by The Center For Security Policy in Washington, DC, October 25, 1994). General (ret.) John Foss, former Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command; General (ret.) Al Gray, former Commandant, US Marine Corps; Lt. General (ret.) John J. Pustay, former Ass't to the Chmn, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General (ret.) Bernard Schriever, former Commander US Air Force Systems Command; Admiral (ret.) Carl Trost, former Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral (deceased) Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations; Douglas J. Feith, former Ass't Secretary of Defense; Frank J. Gaffney, former Acting Ass't Secretary of Defense; Richard Perle, former Ass't Secretary of Defense; Eugene V. Rostow, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Henry S. Rowen, former Ass't Secretary of Defense;

DOES IT MAKE SENSE TO INCREASE ISRAEL'S VULNERABILITY TO CONVENTIONAL THREAT, as a result of a Golan Giveaway, AT A TIME WHEN THE BALLISTIC THREAT IS GROWING?! The US maintained its conventional edge - during the Cold War - while staying ahead of the USSR in the non-conventional and nuclear race.

THE US RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF TERRITORY IN THE BALLISTIC ERA: The US, the leading ballistic power in the world, controls some 100 overseas military bases and installations, situated at strategically vital locations. The US has recognized the fact that all wars have been conventional, focusing on ground features (India-Pakistan, US-Iraq, US-Panama, Russia-Chechnya, Britain-Argentina, Ethipia-Eritrea, Serbia-Bosnia, etc.)


Israel's capabilities to fend off a surprise attack depend on its ability to rapidly deploy reserve force, which amount to 75% of its total military force. Until deployment is completed, invading Arab armored force (75% regular) could enjoy a 7:1 advantage! The more sophisticated the in-coming Arab missiles, the more vulnerable are the main road junctions, military depots and air force bases in Israel, which are critical for rapid deployment of reservists and for the containment of an armored Arab offensive. The more disrupted is the Israeli deployment process and the more vulnerable are Israel's air force bases to Arab missiles, the greater is the importance of ground barriers, which enable Israel's regulars to contain the invading armored forces. In 1973, it was the mountain ridge of the eastern Golan Heights overlooking Damascus- and not the slopes overlooking the Lake of Galilee(!) - which enabled 177 Israeli tanks to hold off a surprise attack by 1,400 Syrian tanks, until the arrival of the reservists. Conceding the eastern mountain ridge - a most unique natural tank barrier - would enable a surprise Syrian tank offensive, assisted by a barrage of missiles, to reach the Galilee in 3 hours!

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